MEDIA RELEASE | What’s wrong with City Power and how to fix it

Johannesburg’s next government will inherit an electricity utility in deep trouble. City Power’s infrastructure is deteriorating, its finances are precarious, much of the electricity it buys never becomes revenue, and it has been without permanent leadership for long periods.

Powering Joburg’s Turnaround, published today by the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE), is the fourth report in the series, Johannesburg Matters: Fixing South Africa’s growth engine.

“To turn City Power around, a new City government will need to put capable people in charge, give the utility control over its own revenue, collect what it is owed, and bring in the private sector,” said CDE executive director Ann Bernstein.

“Residents experience the failures of Joburg’s most important entities through power outages, dry taps, sewage spills and streets filled with uncollected refuse. Behind these failures are utilities under severe financial pressure, years of inadequate maintenance, weak management, enormous infrastructure backlogs and procurement failures,” added Bernstein.

Don’t dismantle key utilities, fix them. Some candidates for Johannesburg’s next mayor argue for the collapse of some or all the entities back into the City administration. CDE disagrees. Re-integration now would not address the underlying problems; it could even make things worse.

“Collapsing them back into an already weak City administration will not fix them. It would change where the functions sit without addressing the problems that have left the utilities unable to deliver. And it would bog down the entire City administration in a very big restructuring process for years when what is required is the urgent restoration of reliable service delivery,” said Bernstein.

Keeping the lights on. While load shedding has become less acute as a major national issue, Johannesburg has continued to struggle to keep the lights on. Between July 2025 and March 2026, City Power reported 2.1 million forced interruptions. It took City Power 11 hours on average to restore each forced interruption. Many customers experienced multiple interruptions, which means that customers experienced, on average, 20.6 hours without electricity during this period. In some cases, customers went for weeks without power.

Of the total power outages in Johannesburg, 60 per cent were caused by deteriorating and outdated networks. City Power estimates that its infrastructure backlog stands at R44.25 billion.

Money in, money out. From 2019 onward, a persistent and widening gap has opened up between expenditure and revenue. By 2025, the deficit amounted to R4.3 billion, excluding capital grants and contributions. City Power’s net internal overdraft with the City had reached approximately R19.1 billion by 31 March 2026.

Revenue from electricity sales is not ring-fenced for City Power. Instead of exercising control over the revenue it generates, these funds are regularly ‘swept’ into the City’s consolidated revenue pool, with funds then transferred back to City Power to meet its financial requirements and operations.

In November 2025, the City committed to ring-fence revenue for City Power and Joburg Water, with 70 per cent retained by the utilities and 30 per cent transferred to the City.

CDE would ask: On what basis was this ratio determined or is it arbitrary? And is it enough? City Power is already struggling to cover its operating costs, before even considering its infrastructure backlog.

Electricity that never becomes revenue. Electricity Minister Kgosientsho Ramokgopa described the problem starkly in 2026: “For every R100 of bulk purchases, (City Power) can only reticulate about R70. They’ve already lost R30, even before they can collect. So, you can see that’s a race to the bottom.”

City Power’s third quarter report in 2025/26 put overall meter-reading performance at approximately 72 per cent against a target of 98 per cent, with more than 36 000 customer registers generating no bills during a billing cycle. At the end of June 2026, City Power was owed around R13.3 billion by its customers.

No one in charge. City Power has serious capacity issues, from its senior leadership to the technical staff needed to run the electricity network. It operates today with an acting CEO. In 2024/25, of City Power’s 278 professionally qualified posts, 122 (or 44 per cent) were vacant. Among senior technicians, 36 (72 per cent) of 50 posts were vacant. Critical posts have remained vacant for hundreds of days, with some unfilled for over two and a half years.

What the next administration should do

  • Fix the leadership, by starting with the board and the CEO, and then by getting the right people into mission-critical positions – the focus should be on areas such as managing finances, technical expertise and fixing procurement processes. Without merit appointments in senior positions, City Power will not be fixed.
  • Implementing ring-fencing clearly and consistently, giving City Power more control and certainty over the revenue generated, while also permitting a non-arbitrary process through which some of that revenue can be allocated to urgent, budgeted needs that the City needs to fund, like repairing roads and water infrastructure.
  • Radically improving revenue collection, by giving City Power the mandate to sort out customer and property records, improve meter reading, resolve billing disputes, and implement strategies to rebuild trust with customers while also implementing a firm but fair strategy to cut off customers who fail to pay their bills.
  • Bringing in the private sector, with an emphasis on practical, accountable and transparent service and performance-based contracts that will bring in private sector technical and managerial expertise quickly and effectively, ensuring that they contribute quickly and positively to turning the entity around.

The scale of the infrastructure backlogs and the loss of technical and management capacity mean that Johannesburg will need private capital, specialist skills and probably outside management capacity. Bringing in the private sector should therefore form a cornerstone of the utilities’ recovery.

“This does not mean that private participation should substitute for functioning public institutions,” said Bernstein. “Johannesburg needs organisations capable of ensuring universal service and equity obligations, specifying what must be done, managing contracts, protecting public assets and holding private providers accountable for results.”

The first 100 days. The report offers a strategy for the first 100 days, set out by a senior businessman with experience in electricity utility turnaround and management. “It is imperative to do a few decisive things in the right order: stabilise leadership, secure the cash, stop the bleeding, keep the lights on. Sequence ruthlessly, and crucially, say where the people and money will come from,” said Bernstein.

In the first month, the mayor stabilises the leadership by appointing an empowered, time-bound crisis executive with a small war room, while the City recruits a permanent CEO. The second month is about stopping the bleeding, including town-hall meetings in the three most-affected service delivery centres to present a clear plan, give tough messages and make an arrears normalisation offer. The final stretch is about locking it in and showing progress: a permanent CEO and CFO appointed, and a return to the same town halls to report back.

“Ultimately, there are no easy or quick fixes. The strategy will need to be decisive, realistic and carefully planned,” said Bernstein.

“Johannesburg’s voters have an important opportunity on 4 November 2026,” she added. “The state of the City’s utilities, and what should be done to fix them, should be part of the debate about Johannesburg’s future. Parties and candidates seeking to govern the City should be pressed to explain how they will restore reliable electricity, water and refuse collection, and how they will rebuild the institutions responsible for delivering them.”

Powering Joburg’s Turnaround is available here.

The report draws extensively on a specially commissioned report Fix City Power Johannesburg, by Chris Yelland and Linsey Dyer.

For media enquiries and interview requests, please contact Refiloe Benjamin: media@cde.org.za | 079 863 6134

Media materials

  • Ann Bernstein’s picture, here.
  • Powering Joburg’s Turnaround cover image, here.
  • Image used on the cover (please credit Bidvest Protea Coin), here.

ABOUT JOHANNESBURG MATTERS: Fixing South Africa’s growth engine

Johannesburg Matters: Fixing South Africa’s growth engine is a new series of reports from the Centre for Development and Enterprise, based on a large research programme into the major challenges confronting the city. The series will provide analysis and recommendations that a new political leadership and reformed administration could implement after the elections as they commence the difficult job of rebuilding South Africa’s most important urban centre.

 ABOUT CDE

CDE is an independent policy research and advocacy organisation. It is South Africa’s leading development think tank, focusing on critical development issues and their relationship to economic growth and democratic consolidation. Through examining South African realities and international experience, coupled with high-level forums, workshops and roundtables, CDE formulates practical policy proposals outlining ways in which South Africa can tackle major social and economic challenges. CDE has a special focus on the role of business and markets in development.

Related posts