CDE

JOHANNESBURG MATTERS

FIXING SOUTH AFRICA'S GROWTH ENGINE

1

Joburg in Jeopardy

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Johannesburg Matters: Fixing South Africa's Growth Engine
Series editor: Ann Bernstein

Reports in the **Johannesburg Matters** series are based on commissioned research, intensive internal research and wide-ranging consultations with experts and stakeholders. This document and the other reports in the series are available from CDE and can be downloaded from www.cde.org.za.

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About CDE

CDE is an independent policy research and advocacy organisation. It is South Africa's leading development think tank, focusing on critical development issues and their relationship to economic growth and democratic consolidation. Through examining South African realities and international experience, coupled with high-level forums, workshops and roundtables, CDE formulates practical policy proposals outlining ways in which South Africa can tackle major social and economic challenges. CDE has a special focus on the role of business and markets in development.

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Johannesburg Matters: Fixing South Africa's growth engine is a new series of reports from the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE), based on a large research programme into the major challenges confronting the city.

Johannesburg's future depends on the forthcoming local government election delivering a metro government committed to rebuilding a city crippled by maladministration, corruption and a fiscal crisis. After nine mayors in ten years, the city needs effective leadership and stable management.

South Africa needs Johannesburg to once more become an inviting place in which to live and do business and expand opportunities for a growing population. A national economic, social and political recovery needs a prosperous Johannesburg powering growth, investment and employment in the country and on the continent.

The **Johannesburg Matters** series will provide analysis and recommendations that a new City political leadership and reformed administration could implement after the elections as they commence the difficult job of rebuilding South Africa's most important urban centre. They cannot do this alone – success will require partnerships within and beyond the city.

CDE is an independent think tank; we are not involved in party politics. We are a national resource, committed to building a prosperous democracy with expanding opportunities for everyone. Our research and recommendations are public and available to all. Our interest is in the city's future and its contribution to national economic growth and development.

This is **the first report** in the series.

Joburg in Jeopardy

Introduction

No country can grow – let alone transform – without functional, thriving cities. An urbanising South Africa is no exception.

For three decades, CDE has urged South African leaders and policymakers to put cities at the centre of the country's strategy for growth, development and inclusion. As the urban proportion of the population grows, employment, productivity, firm formation and wage rates will all rise, benefitting the whole country.[1] This, of course, depends on effective management of the country's cities.

Johannesburg has long been South Africa's largest and most important city. It has enormous potential to create dynamic, innovative economic activities that could provide ladders out of poverty for millions of people. This requires a city government that provides the infrastructure, basic services and future- oriented planning to enable cities to thrive and their residents to prosper. Over twenty years ago, CDE argued that "Johannesburg will rise or fall on its ability to attract, retain, and create skilled and entrepreneurial people."[2]

Unfortunately, Johannesburg has descended into a state of deep dysfunction and severe financial stress. Infrastructure is collapsing, service delivery is failing, the cost of doing business is rising, entrepreneurs, investors and skilled professionals are leaving, many residents are becoming poorer, and there is little or no effective planning for the future. Organised business has described the current state of the city as "a national economic emergency," Treasury has threatened to withhold funds and Eskom has indicated that it could suspend electricity supply to the city over unpaid debt. This situation cannot be sustained.[3]

In this, the first report in CDE's **Johannesburg Matters** series, we explain why preventing the collapse of Johannesburg must be a national priority. We point to the gravest failures of city government and demonstrate how they are affecting not only the residents of Johannesburg, but the economic growth and inclusion prospects of the entire country. The failure of Johannesburg impacts on what should be one of South Africa's great assets – a national system of successful cities anchored on Johannesburg.

We conclude by outlining CDE's contribution to fixing Johannesburg in the run up to the elections over the next few months. Restoring South Africa's growth engine is a national priority.

> Preventing the collapse of Johannesburg must be a national priority. The failure of the City impacts on what should be one of South Africa's biggest assets - a national system of successful cities anchored on Johannesburg.

Why Johannesburg matters

Johannesburg is the country's largest commercial, retail and financial centre. It is a corporate hub, hosting 70 per cent of South African company head offices.[4] Business sectors span mining, manufacturing and, especially, services. Johannesburg remains the financial centre of South Africa, anchoring what Harvard University professor Ricardo Hausmann has described as "the deepest financial market in the developing world".[5] It houses the continent's largest stock exchange and the largest fresh produce market. People come from all over the country and sub-continent to shop in the city's high-end malls. There is also a vast, mainly informal trading economy, where cross-border and local traders travel to buy goods in the inner city that are distributed throughout the country and across Africa.[6]

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The City of Johannesburg is a sprawling metropolis of over 1 600 square kilometres, stretching from Midrand in the north to Orange Farm in the south, from Roodepoort in the west to Bruma in the east. The original city centre, now in steep and accelerating decline, is only one economic node among many. Others include Fourways, Randburg, Roodepoort, Rosebank and Sandton. Equally scattered across the city, but mostly confined to its outskirts, are established townships like Soweto, Ivory Park, Alexandra and Diepsloot and more than 300 informal settlements that mainly house the poor.

Over the past two decades, the city's population has grown by approximately 83 per cent from 3.2 million in 2001 to 5.9 million in 2025 (probably an undercount).[7] It is relatively young, with between 37 to 40 per cent of the city's population aged between 15 and 34. Johannesburg has a highly diverse, well-established urbanised population. People from many different parts of South and southern Africa and beyond have lived and worked here for generations and continue to migrate to the city.

Johannesburg is part of a broader, increasingly integrated Gauteng City Region that includes the Tshwane and Ekurhuleni metro areas. Gauteng accounts for over a third of South Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Approximately 47 per cent of personal income tax collected in South Africa comes from Gauteng, with 21.8 per cent from Johannesburg, making the city the single most important metro nationally in terms of tax generation.[8] About 11 per cent of South Africa's jobs are in Johannesburg, with 1.91 million people employed in the city, compared to 1.84 million in Cape Town and 1.29 million in eThekwini.[9]

South Africa cannot afford to let this vitally important city fail.

> Johannesburg is part of an increasingly integrated Gauteng City Region that includes Tshwane and Ekurhuleni. It is the single most important metro nationally in terms of tax generation: 21.8 per cent of personal income tax collected in South Africa comes from Johannesburg.

A collapsing city

Well-run cities are places where it is easy to do business. Both transport and accommodation are affordable and accessible, and meet the diverse needs of residents. The informal sector is a space where new businesses can start and less affluent people can be self-employed, although, as far as possible, informality should be a temporary rather than a permanent state.

Such cities have reliable and cost-effective water and energy generally available through well-maintained infrastructure networks that reach every part of the city. Solid waste and sewerage are managed effectively to prevent unhealthy living conditions. Public spaces (pavements, parks, roads) are clean and regularly maintained. The streets are safe. Public money is spent sustainably and transparently.

The further cities deviate from these characteristics, the less likely it is they will generate growth, expand opportunities or attract investment, entrepreneurs, managers and professionals of all kinds.

The City of Johannesburg fails across virtually every dimension of its mandate. The consequences are dire for the future of the city, the welfare of its residents and national economic development. We will briefly illustrate this in six areas.

MAP OF JOHANNESBURG SHOWING THE SEVEN REGIONS OF THE CITY

Region A	Diepsloot, Kya Sands, Dainfern, Midrand, Lanseria, Fourways
Region B	Randburg, Rosebank, Emmarentia, Greenside, Melville, Mayfair, Northcliff, Rosebank, Parktown, Parktown North
Region C	Roodepoort, Constantia Kloof, Northgate, Florida, Bram Fischerville
Region D	Doorkop, Soweto, Dobsonville, Protea Glen
Region E	Alexandra, Wynberg, Sandton, Orange Grove, Houghton
Region F	Inner City, Johannesburg South
Region G	Orange Farm, Weilers Farm, Ennerdale, Lenasia, Eldorado Park, Protea South

Source: Pikitup, 2015

1. Failure to maintain and provide new infrastructure

Years of underinvestment have left Johannesburg's basic infrastructure in a state of advanced decay. Johannesburg Water has acknowledged an infrastructure renewal backlog estimated at R26.6 billion, while replacing only 60 to 70 kilometres of piping annually. At this pace, fully replacing the City's ageing pipe network of more than 12 500 kilometres would take close to two centuries.[10] The City acknowledges its loss of more than 226.9 megalitres of water through leaks every single day, resulting in 45 per cent of the water the City buys from Rand Water generating no revenue.[11]

The City has an estimated electricity infrastructure backlog estimated at R44 billion.[12] Between July and December 2025, Johannesburg recorded 54 132 power outages, including 105 high voltage failures - a 22 per cent increase on the previous year.[13] Cable theft and vandalism accounted for 20 per cent of those outages.[14]

Failing water and electricity services reduce the quality of life for all residents and raise the cost of doing business significantly, eating into firms' revenues and compelling some to close or relocate, which results in fewer jobs and a shrinking rates base.

The inability to deliver services and collapsing infrastructure create a hostile and uncertain environment for housing developers, especially the micro-developers who have been active in expanding affordable rental accommodation in Johannesburg's suburbs. As CDE argued in our 2021 report, *Building Better Cities*, micro-developers, densifying Johannesburg's inner suburbs with well-located, affordable low-income housing, would thrive in an environment in which the City brings down unnecessary costs while ensuring that new buildings are meeting adequate standards.[15] In declining neighbourhoods, by contrast, builders cut corners and will not be able to access capital and bridging loans at reasonable rates. As a result, the quantity and quality of affordable accommodation declines, property rights are eroded, and informality and decline spreads.

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2. Transport challenges, potholed roads, and broken traffic lights

In a large, sprawling city like Johannesburg, transport is the nerve system of economic life.[16] Yet the City's transport infrastructure is in an advanced state of disrepair. The estimated maintenance backlog now stands at R90 billion for roads and R37 billion for bridges.[17] Between July and December 2025, residents reported 23 572 potholes to the Johannesburg Roads Agency - an average of nearly 3 900 per month.[18] During the final quarter of 2025, approximately 55 per cent of the City's traffic lights experienced faults.[19]

The most determined attempt to provide an alternative to the minibus taxis on which most commuters rely, the Rea Vaya bus rapid transit system, has never delivered the integrated, convenient transport solution that its proponents promised. After years of mismanagement, failure to meet targets and non-payment to bus operators, the system is facing collapse. Like many other parts of the City, the bus rapid transit system is under severe financial pressure and has shut down critical feeder routes, including routes from Soweto that have not operated for over a year.[20] A full-blown crisis now seems imminent as National Treasury has reportedly questioned the value of national government's investments into transport services like Rea Vaya and is considering phasing out the funding.

The consequences fall most heavily on the poor. While the average household in Johannesburg spends 29 per cent of its income on transport, households in townships and peripheral areas spend more than 40 per cent of their household income getting to and from work.[21] Long travel times and high transport costs increase the cost of doing business and the reservation wage for labour. It also reduces productive interactions between residents, constrains labour market access, and reduces the potential opportunities for inclusion that cities provide when they connect households to centres of economic and educational activity. Road deterioration and malfunctioning traffic lights also lead to lawlessness and declining safety in the city.

3. Rampant crime and unsafe neighbourhoods

High levels of crime have become one of the most significant markers of Johannesburg's decline. From April 2012 to March 2025, the annual murder rate increased from 25.6 reported murders per 100 000 people to 35.6 reported murders per 100 000 people, placing the city among the most dangerous urban centres globally.[22] There have been reported improvements in the last year. However, in the 2025/26 reporting period, an average of 388 serious crimes were reported in the city every single day.[23] Johannesburg leads the country in kidnapping and robbery with aggravating circumstances.

Residents across the city are certainly feeling the negative impact of rampant crime. According to the Gauteng City-Region Observatory Quality of Life Survey (GCRO QoL), more than a third consider crime to be the biggest problem confronting their community, and

84 per cent of residents feel unsafe walking at night.[24] High levels of crime prevent people from running viable businesses, make night markets, night schools and 24-hour use of factories or workspaces impossible, and push those with skills and capital out of Johannesburg.

Crime has greatly contributed to the deterioration of Johannesburg's inner city, where criminal syndicates now operate buildings with relative impunity, damaging infrastructure, running 'hijacked' buildings, and driving businesses away.

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The City of Johannesburg has limited direct control over public policing and criminal prosecution (as these are national functions) but that does not diminish the challenge. Johannesburg's crime levels place severe limits on the city's growth potential, with negative consequences for all its residents.

4. Administrative chaos

Johannesburg's planning and approvals processes have long been inadequate, but the situation is now dire. In 2020, the World Bank found that South Africa's metros required applicants for building permits to complete 20 steps taking an average of 155 days. This was about ten more steps and 40 per cent more costly than the average for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member countries.[25]

The situation in Johannesburg has deteriorated dramatically since then, most sharply following a 2023 fire that rendered unsafe the Metro Centre containing the City's planning records and building drawings. Rather than fixing it, officials decided to abandon the building, renting private office space at great cost and leaving the paper-based records and plans behind, partly sealed off and largely unattended. These plans are the entire legal and planning history of the city. Without them, neither coherent planning nor effective approval processes have any chance of emerging.[26] Property owners and developers have reportedly been forced to redraw plans at additional costs ranging between R20 000 and R50 000 simply to proceed with approvals and financing.[27]

The consequences extend well beyond inconvenience. Growing uncertainty and administrative delays, compounded by infrastructure deficits and deteriorating municipal capacity, make it harder to expand the supply of housing. According to the City, in 2025 Johannesburg faced a housing deficit estimated at over 430 000 units.[28]

Property rights are eroding across many parts of the city. The phenomenon of 'hijacked' buildings in the inner city is extensive. These buildings are illegally occupied and are unlawfully rented out by individuals and criminal syndicates to vulnerable people in desperate need of accommodation. Neighbourhoods like Yeoville, Troyeville and Berea are now characterised by neglected properties, overcrowding and illegal connections, with owners unable to remove non-paying or unlawful occupants. In one extreme case, in the affluent suburb of Bryanston, there are reportedly 70 families illegally occupying one property.[29] Other, slightly less extreme, instances are reportedly occurring in this and other suburbs.[30]

5. Bankruptcy nearing

Johannesburg's disastrous financial situation has triggered an extraordinary intervention by National Treasury. In a letter in April 2026, Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana warned that the City is in "severe financial distress". According to the Minister, Johannesburg owes creditors

R25.2 billion but holds only R3.9 billion in cash and cash equivalents. Subsequently, in early July, the Minister announced that Johannesburg was one of 69 municipalities that would have its equitable share allocation withheld until it sorted out billions in unauthorised, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure, and corrected its unfunded budget.[31] The money was subsequently paid out, but it is clear that Treasury is determined to tackle this challenge with the seriousness it deserves.

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Mismanagement and corruption are crucial contributors to financial distress. However, an immediate challenge is the combination of falling revenue at a time of rising employee costs. The City is struggling to collect revenue: more than 80 per cent of the municipal debtors' book now consists of revenue considered irrecoverable.[32] At the same time, employee costs have escalated sharply over the last decade, a challenge exacerbated by the 2025 agreement between the City and the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU), which will reportedly cost the City R10.3 billion over the next three years. National Treasury has concluded that this agreement is unaffordable and, therefore, illegal.[33]

Over and above the SAMWU wage agreement, in the latest City budget, executive salaries have substantially increased. For example, Joburg Property Company's CEO salary increased by 62 per cent to R5.5 million. As Julia Fish of NGO JoburgCAN, put it, the high salaries that senior managers earn are justified as necessary "to attract highly skilled people away from the private sector, but these executive officers have largely been promoted from within, and the payments are definitely not in line with a failing business's financial actions."[34]

The absence of stable finances threatens to collapse the City entirely. No private investor, development partner, or service provider will commit resources to an organisation facing financial ruin. The fiscal crisis is both a symptom and often a cause of the other failures described in this report.

6. Leadership failure and political instability

Underlying Johannesburg's many challenges is a crisis of leadership. Since 2016, the City has had nine different mayors, with no individual completing a full five-year term. The City has operated under eight different coalition administrations, with political control shifting repeatedly through motions of no confidence, court rulings, and renegotiated political agreements. As a result, stable long-term planning has all but disappeared.[35]

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Motions of no confidence have been used within this system of power-sharing, not only to remove leaders but as part of day-to-day political manoeuvring between parties.[36] As a result, appointments within the administration and municipal entities are regularly reshaped to reflect shifting coalitions and political alliances. These appointments reflect political considerations rather than candidates' capabilities or professional suitability for specific roles. The current chairs of the boards of City Power, Johannesburg Water, Pikitup and the Johannesburg Development Agency are all active or former members of political party structures.[37] None of the Johannesburg Water Board members are professionally qualified engineers despite the City's facing one of its worst water crises in decades.[38]

In this context of political instability, no city can function properly, and no real solutions to accelerating decline are possible. Instead, rampant patronage, mismanagement, corruption and links to organised crime have flourished.

Decline of Johannesburg's urban promise

If Johannesburg continues on its current path the consequences will be felt nationally. Johannesburg has historically been South Africa's great arena of opportunity, drawing in people from across the country, and the region, in search of work, mobility and a better life. As the city becomes less able to perform that role, opportunities for upward mobility become more restricted for millions.

Harvard urban economist Professor Ed Glaeser has highlighted two central aspects of urban management that all cities need to get right. Firstly, they need to promote property development. That means creating an environment in which developers, businesses and households want to invest so that they can pay the rates and taxes required to fund vital city activities like infrastructure provision, maintenance and service delivery. They will also help drive and fund a vibrant economy that makes the city attract more talented people.

The second part of effective city management, Glaeser argues, is poverty alleviation, which is best done indirectly by finding ways to connect the poor to the opportunities created by a dynamic, expanding urban economy. Glaeser argues that cities should be judged not by how many poor people live in them, but by how quickly the poor are able to move out of poverty. Cities should, therefore "think of themselves as non-profit institutions aimed at poverty alleviation that happen to own, and are funded by, a profit-maximising entity that is involved in property development."[39]

In Johannesburg, municipal dysfunction ensures that property development is in decline, that higher- income households are under pressure, and that the poor suffer the most through lack of access to well-located, affordable housing options, to jobs and to skills acquisition.

> Cities should be judged not by how many poor people live in them, but by how quickly the poor are able to move out of poverty.

One symptom is the decline in the effectiveness of property ownership as a vehicle for wealth creation. Over the past 10 years, Johannesburg recorded a cumulative house price decrease of 2 per cent compared with an approximate 60 per cent increase in Cape Town.[40] This sustained underperformance weakens household wealth, reduces investment incentives and erodes the property rates base on which the municipality depends.

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At the same time, the cost of municipal services continues to rise as the City struggles to bring in the revenue required to keep itself afloat financially.[41] Rising tariffs at a time of increasing financial pressure and declining service quality makes many residents and businesses ask why they are paying more while receiving less. This creates a growing dynamic of frustration with local government and weakens confidence in Johannesburg as a place to live and invest.

As municipal systems deteriorate, access to basic services increasingly depends on private resources rather than public provision. Households with sufficient means mitigate the risk of failure by paying for private security, solar power, boreholes and water storage systems. Those without such resources remain fully exposed to the consequences of failing municipal services.[42]

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Unsurprisingly, in this context, many Johannesburg residents have become less satisfied with their quality of life. According to the GCRO QoL survey, the mean quality of life index fell from 65 to 61 between 2017 and 2024, driven by the share of respondents with poor life quality increasing from 10 per cent to 19 per cent, while a simultaneous decline was recorded among those reporting an excellent quality of life from 20 per cent to 12 per cent.[43]

One of the most serious consequences of Johannesburg's decline is the city's reduced ability to absorb labour. In the second quarter of 2026, the city recorded the highest official unemployment rate among South Africa's metropolitan municipalities at 35.9 per cent, with expanded unemployment reaching 40.1 per cent. By comparison, Cape Town's official unemployment rate stood at 21.9 per cent, rising to 24.3 per cent when discouraged work-seekers were included. Between the second quarter of 2025 and the second quarter of 2026, Johannesburg lost approximately 90 000 jobs, while Cape Town added 57 000.[44]

The spatial characteristics of poverty and joblessness remain firmly entrenched. The further residents live away from economic hubs the more likely they are to be unemployed and poor. In the affluent Rosebank-Sandton corridor, there are up to 15 000 jobs per square kilometre, with under 1 000 working-age people per square kilometre living there. In stark contrast, Soweto has less than 500 jobs, but up to 46 800 working-age people per square kilometre.[45]

A further consequence is fewer people from beyond the city gaining access to economic opportunities that well-run cities can provide. There are concerns about the accuracy of the 2022 Census, but experts believe that Johannesburg's population growth rate has slowed noticeably since around 2010, which probably reflects the declining attractiveness of the city as a destination for migrants, including those from rural South Africa.[46]

Fixing South Africa's growth engine: A national priority

Johannesburg is not merely another troubled municipality like many others. It is South Africa's largest and most important city, the centre of the country's financial and corporate economy, and a critical source of employment, investment and opportunity. Its decline therefore has consequences far beyond its municipal boundaries.

In many ways, Johannesburg is a microcosm of South Africa in 2026. Corruption, criminality, political instability and administrative incompetence have damaged the basic institutions on which growth and development depend. City finances are under severe pressure. Electricity and water services are increasingly unreliable. Infrastructure has deteriorated. The capacity and authority of the municipal administration have been weakened.

The first steps of reform are therefore clear – we have to fix what has been broken. The fundamental functions of government must be rebuilt for the city to become the place of opportunity, economic dynamism and new development that all its residents and the country so desperately need.

> If Johannesburg cannot be fixed can we fix South Africa?

Since late 2025, CDE has made Johannesburg a major focus of its work. Why is a national think tank so concerned about one city?

The empirical evidence and international experience is overwhelming: cities are central to a country's national growth and development. The future of this city is a national concern. Johannesburg remains South Africa's principal economic gateway to the world and sits at the heart of the country's urban system. Its success would strengthen the national economy;its continued decline would damage the prospects of the poor, the middle class and business, both within the city and across the country.

More than that: it is the one municipality whose failure would make national success impossible, raising the critical question: if Johannesburg cannot be fixed, can we fix South Africa?

CDE's work has been built on the conviction that the city cannot be turned around or saved without a significant change in its politics and improved governance.

Our work has focused on three areas. Firstly, strategic discussions with business leaders on their interest in and role in helping to rebuild the city if a stable and serious new government emerges after the elections in November this year. Secondly, we have established a regular discussion group with the many NGOs and other civic initiatives wrestling with the city's decline (see series of short reports, **Johannesburg in Brief,** here). Finally, we have managed a large research programme digging deep into the critical dimensions of what is going wrong in the city. This has included leading experts, other policy organisations and CDE's own research to diagnose the crisis facing the city and how to rebuild in 2027.

In the next few months, CDE will release a series of short reports backed by independent research. These reports will cover some of the most important foundational issues facing Johannesburg:

- The City's finances and the steps needed to restore fiscal credibility;
- Organised crime and corruption within and around the City's political leadership and administration;
- The governance crisis within the municipal administration, including the City's major service entities, especially City Power and Johannesburg Water;
- The present condition and future potential of Johannesburg's economy across its different regions;
- A final report summarising our recommendations for action.

Taken together, we will provide an integrated diagnosis of what has gone wrong and a practical agenda for rebuilding the city.

> A continuation of the current political and governance dysfunction would deepen Johannesburg's decline. The choice facing voters is a stark and vitally important one.

Although our work covers the most pressing challenges the city faces, they are not the only ones the new mayor and governing team will need to prioritise. Once the basics of city government are back on track, it will be possible to turn attention towards the many other important issues that matter – transport, housing, lawlessness, support for local community organisations and much more – all of which are vital to making Johannesburg a thriving city.

The city's crisis is not primarily technical, it is political.

The November local government elections are key to any discussion on rebuilding Johannesburg. A continuation of the current political and governance dysfunction would deepen Johannesburg's decline. A weak and unstable coalition would struggle to take difficult decisions, appoint capable people, attract partners and investors or sustain a multi-year programme of reform. The choice facing voters is a stark and vitally important one.

Johannesburg can be fixed. This is only possible IF the elections produce a new and stable City political leadership that mobilises the best possible people (not only from within political parties) to help fix the city. However, even with honest, competent and committed leadership, the city cannot do this alone.

Success will require effective partnerships that build on Johannesburg's many extraordinary assets, including its vibrant private sector, deep financial markets, many educational institutions and its dynamic citizens and civic organisations. These assets provide the basis for recovery – but only if they are matched by effective governance and bold reforms. It will also require a special response from national government.

Amidst the current gloom, it is important to hold on to the enormous potential of Johannesburg: a place where young people can build a future, businesses can expand and new startups emerge, and individuals can live and see their families prosper. The city can once again become a powerful engine of growth, opportunity and upward mobility for its current residents and for the country as a whole.

> Johannesburg can be fixed. This is only possible IF the elections produce a new and stable City political leadership that mobilises the best possible people (not only from within political parties) to help fix the city. Johannesburg cannot do this alone.

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